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The Changing Political Identity of the  




This paper explores the role played by the Chinese communities in the Australian politics of multicultural 
democracy from the perspective of political socialisation and re-socialisation. It argues that there is no such a thing 
as inherent “cultural values” or “national values” that differentiate ‘the Chinese” politically from the mainstream 
Australian society. This paper focuses on the Chinese nationalism of Han Chinese migrants in Australia. Within the 
“new mainland migrants” who have come to Australia directly from the PRC since the 1980s, nationalism is much 
weaker among the Tiananmen/ June 4 generation who experienced pro-democracy activism during their formative 
years in the 1980s. Nationalism is much stronger among the Post-Tiananmen Generation who are victims of the 
“patriotism campaign” in the 1990s when the Chinese Communist party-state sought to replace discredited 
communism with nationalism as the major ideology for legitimacy.   
 
 
Although ethnic Chinese account for only 3% of the total population of Australia, Chinese 
citizens became the largest group of immigrants to Australia in 2009, displacing the traditional 
sources of Britain and New Zealand (Tatlow 2010). How the Chinese communities play a role in 
Australian politics is a question of great interest to the academic community as well as the 
public, especially when the political role of Chinese Australians is complicated by the growing 
influence of rising China. Equally interesting are the contrasting identities of the Chinese 
students in Australia, as the democracy fighters and asylum seekers appealing to democratic 
governments in the West and attacking the Chinese communist regime in 1989, and as fanatical 
nationalist and zealous Chinese patriots denouncing democratic governments in the West and 
defending the same Chinese communist regime in 2008.   With a focus on the distinctive groups 
of the “new migrants of mainland China” (dalu xin yimin) who have come to Australia directly 
from the PRC since the 1980s, this paper seeks to shed light on the growing trend of state-
sponsored Chinese transnationalism and the ways political beliefs and behaviours of ethnic 
Chinese in Australia are shaped by their political socialisation back in China.  
 
The term “new migrants of mainland China” was first coined by Chinese migrants in the United 
States in the 1980s and adopted by the Chinese government, referring to the Chinese immigrants 
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who are mostly “born and brought up under the Red Flag” after the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, and have migrated overseas after the “reform and opening to 
the outside world” at the end of the1970s (Huang et al. 1998; Zhu 2006). What is the cultural, 
ideological or political baggage carried by these “new migrants”? Reflecting cultural 
determinism, there is a long held view or stereotype which asserts that “the Chinese” carry a 
special set of “cultural values” or “national values”. Some try to understand this special set of 
“national values” in terms of deep-rooted “political culture” (Pye 1985), others attribute it to the 
mysterious “deep structure of Chinese culture” (Sun 1993). It is claimed that the Confucian 
tradition or other traditions, as handed down from millennia of Chinese history, with their stress 
on hierarchy and conformity, have prevented the Chinese from developing an independent 
personality and nurtured paternalistic and despotic government. Assertions of this sort are not 
supported by empirical evidence, given the fact that the Chinese society in Taiwan has achieved 
stable liberal democracy, that democratisation with robust civil society and active political 
citizenry is well underway in the Chinese society in Hong Kong, and that the Overseas Chinese 
living in democracies in the West have engaged in democratic politics with great enthusiasm. 
Some scholars have convincingly argued that the alleged political apathy of the Chinese is 
nothing but psychological and behavioural manifestation contingent on power structure and 
opportunity structure, springing from the lack of channels for political participation (Lau 1982). 
 
As to the diametrically opposed roles performed by Chinese migrants as democracy fighters and 
authoritarian regime defenders in Australia, a satisfactory explanation can be sought from their 
specific political socialisation and circumstances rather than Confucianism or any other Chinese 
traditions. The concept of political socialisation was devised and widely applied in the 1950s and 
1960s, providing a useful framework to understand the process of inheriting political norms, 
beliefs, ideologies and customs (Parsons and Bales 1956; Chinoy 1961; Clausen 1968). Family, 
school, mass media and religion are normally identified as major agents or factors of 
socialisation. However, under the totalitarian regimes, or post-totalitarian regimes as in the case 
of China today, the successive political campaigns by the party-state play a key role in political 
socialisation. Through education, mass media, mass campaigns and any other possible means, 
the Chinese communist party-state has successfully indoctrinated the vast majority of the 
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population with its discourse on truth, the “laws” governing human societies, the trajectory of 
Chinese history, and the mission of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  
 
According to this discourse, Marxism-Leninism embodies the highest form of truth and 
knowledge showing the correct way to follow the exorable law on the march to the ideal society 
of communism. Other key aspects include “Mao Zedong Thought”, “Deng Xiaoping Theory” 
and the “Theory of Three Represents”, products of creatively combining Marxist theory with 
Chinese practice. There are also a series of historical claims: that the Chinese have a unique 
civilisation with a glorious history for 5000 years but have been humiliated by Western powers 
for more than a century; that the CCP has provided leadership to liberate the Chinese nation from 
endless miseries; and that only under the leadership of the CCP can the Chinese nation stand up 
to the Western hegemony, maintain unity and stability, pursue China's modernisation, and ensure 
economic prosperity and harmonious society for the people. From this perspective, liberal 
democracy which “merely” institutionalises regular elections, independent judiciary and political 
and civil rights “in form” is actually bourgeois dictatorship, whereas the “proletarian 
dictatorship” (or “people’s democratic dictatorship”) under the leadership of the Party is 
“genuine democracy” as the Party represents the interest of “the people” and “serves the people” 
(Lenin 1918; Mao 1949). The Party also lays emphasis on different themes during different 
periods. In the “reform era” since 1978, “socialist democracy” has been expanded to include 
“socialist legality” promoting the concepts of human rights and the rule of law, but in the 
meantime maintaining the supremacy of the Party (Ogden 1989). After the collapse of 
communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1989 and the early 1990s, efforts 
have been made by the CCP to put increasing emphasis on patriotism and the theory of “building 
socialism with Chinese characteristics” while obscuring the tenets of Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought on the themes of class struggle and communist ideal. The ideological 
indoctrination of CCP propaganda has deeply shaped the worldviews of PRC citizens and the 
patterns of their political behaviour. It requires an extraordinary, and sometimes painful, process 
of re-socialisation for them to break away from the communist mode of thinking and embrace 
liberal democracy.  
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Democratic Aspirations of the Generation of the Cultural Revolution and Its Impact on 
Chinese Migrants in Australia  
The generation of Cultural Revolution, who were mostly born in the 1950s and drawn into the 
Cultural Revolution in the period of 1966-1976, experienced several despairs and subsequent 
profound crises of belief. Paradoxically, the Cultural Revolution was a nightmare associated with 
terror, persecution, deception and destruction, but it also taught millions of young Chinese self-
organisation, political mobilisation and the duty to contest the immoral exercise of power. The 
initial stage of the Cultural Revolution was characterised by rebellions answering to the calls of 
the Great Leader Mao Zedong against the authorities and the sending of university and high 
school students all over China to establish extensive ties, but this eventually degenerated into 
endless political persecution and infighting. After the end of the Cultural Revolution this 
generation of Chinese was variously identified as the “lost generation” whose ideals and sense of 
direction were destroyed by ten years of catastrophe, chaos and betrayal. They were the “cynical 
generation” who were plunged into confusion, cynicism and nihilism; and the “rebellious 
generation” or “thinking generation” who reflected on their years of youth with intense pain and 
quested for truth and a new meaning of life (Feng and Benton 1992). Among those lucky ones 
within this generation who were accepted to universities and colleges resumed after the Cultural 
Revolution, or even joined in the “tide of going abroad” to study at the universities in developed 
countries, at least some have experienced spiritual regeneration. They categorically rejected the 
official ideology as cheap idealism, shallow optimism and abject docility; developed scepticism 
and critical thinking; and even found new beliefs in equality, individualism, human rights, the 
rule of law, and constitutional democracy.         
 
The campaign by the Chinese students in Australia to support the pro-democracy movement in 
China in 1989 and the campaign by them to achieve permanent residency in Australia in the 
early 1990s gave full play to the democratic aspirations and communication skills of the Cultural 
Revolution generation. As Chinese students studying abroad in other parts of the world, 
thousands of Chinese students in major cities of Australia took part in rallies and demonstrations 
in May 1989 to support Chinese students on hunger strike at Tiananmen Square, as well as rallies 
and demonstrations in June 1989 to protest against the Chinese government after the June 4 
Massacre, which fundamentally changed the life of tens of thousands of Chinese students 
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arriving in Australia around the time (Cherrington 1991; Goldman 1994). The June 4 Massacre, 
the subsequent harsh crackdown on pro-democracy movement leaders, and the extensive purge 
of liberal elements from the apparatus of the Party and state generated immense fear of 
persecution and massive alienation from the Chinese communist regime among Chinese students 
studying abroad. Under such extraordinary circumstances democratic countries such Canada and 
the United States offered permanent residency to the Chinese students right away, but the 
Australian government was originally only prepared to offer permanent residency to the Chinese 
arriving in Australia before the June 4 Massacre and other individual students who could 
establish refugee status through political screening on a case by case basis, exposing the Chinese 
students to political risks and uncertainty.  
 
However, the Chinese students turned the table around and almost all of them succeeded in 
securing permanent residency by 1993 through impressive campaigns and lobbying (Gao 2009). 
After the mid-1980s, when Australia set up the scheme of English Language Intensive Course 
for Overseas Students to export its English language education on the international market, 
Chinese citizens, mainly from the Cultural Revolution generation, had taken the opportunity to 
come to Australia in large numbers, with some 20,000 of them arriving in Australia before June 
4 and approximately 25,000 arriving in Australia between June 4 and 1 November 1993. Some 
technical issues added concerns to the Australian immigration regime, as more than 70% of those 
among both cohorts were “language students” and less than 30% of them were “degree 
students”, with more than half of them no longer holding a valid visa when they lodged the 
application for asylum. The reluctance of the Australian government to grant permanent 
residency to the Chinese students was best demonstrated by the fact that the Migration Act of 
Australia was amended 11 times between 1989 and 1992 to tighten the border control and 
abandon the onshore humanitarian program (Cronin 1993). Fortunately the successful campaigns 
of Chinese students persuaded the Australian authorities to join other Western democracies in 
providing protection of PRC nationals onshore and allowing about 45,000 Chinese migrants to 
become permanent residents in Australia, as reflected in the decision made by the Labour 
government on 1 November 1993 and the decision made by the Coalition government on 13 June 
1997.    
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Looking back on the campaigns of the Chinese students for democratic China and permanent 
residency in Australia, the connections between their behaviour abroad and their previous 
political experience and ideological journey back in China are readily visible, such as the 
connections between the formation of their identity as democracy fighters and their new found 
democratic aspirations during the 1980s; between the establishment of the Chinese Association 
for Safeguarding Human Rights and the Working Group for the Investigation of the Basic 
Human Rights of PRC Citizens in Australia and their yeaning for human rights since the late 
1970s; between their extensive networking locally and internationally and their previous 
“massive exchange of revolutionary experience through networking” (da chuanlian); and 
between their skilful use of news media in both Chinese and English and their previous expertise 
in managing big-character posters and tabloids (Yin 2009). It is worth mentioning that both the 
democratic aspirations and the individualism developed among the Cultural Revolution 
generation represent neither the mainstream nor an irreversible trend in Chinese society in spite 
of reform and opening to the outside world.   
 
 
Patriotic Education Campaign in China and the Nationalist “Angry Youth” of the Post-
Tiananmen Generation 
In a scene unprecedented in history and probably unrepeatable in the future, the Australian 
capital Canberra was overwhelmed by “a sea of red flags and placards” carried by thousands of 
Chinese nationals, mostly university students, during the Beijing Olympic Torch Relay on 24 
April 2008 (English and Linnell 2008). About twenty thousand Chinese nationals carrying more 
than ten thousand Chinese national flags were there to “protect the Olympic Torch” from the 
presumed “sabotage” by the Tibetans, a designated “minority nationality” of China. Only two 
thousand of them were from Canberra and most of them came from Melbourne and Sydney by 
more than one hundred coaches overnight. There were also participants taking flights from 
Adelaide, Brisbane, Darwin, Perth and even New Zealand. Actually, two weeks earlier, as in 
many other major cities in the world, thousands of the Chinese students and other Chinese 
nationals in Melbourne and Sydney rallied and marched on 13 April 2008 in protest against “the 
Western media’s dishonest reports” on the March 14 Riot in Tibet (CCTV 2008). On the mid-
night prior to the torch relay, Chinese students had already occupied all of the “strategic 
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positions” of the starting point, the finish point and along the line, in order to exclude Tibetans 
and their supporters (Xinhua 2008). During the torch relay, the Chinese students shouted 
patriotic slogans, sang patriotic songs and repeatedly used violence against the Tibetans and their 
supporters. (Laohu 2008).One activist proudly reflected in the on-the-spot report published on 
the Internet that if the Australian police had acted as French police during the torch relay in Paris 
the number of the Chinese students arrested would be 50 rather than 5, and without the deliberate 
protection by the Australian police none of those “poisonous Tibetans” would be able to safely 
return home (Laohu 2008). 
 
Chinese nationalism has been on the rise in China and among the Overseas Chinese around the 
world since the mid-1990s. Millions of Chinese nationalists are wild with joy, but the 
phenomenon of rising Chinese nationalism has also caused great concerns and has been well 
researched and debated by the academic community (Unger 1996; Zheng 1999; Zhao 2004; 
Giles 2004; Hugh 2006). The upsurge of Chinese nationalism can be partly attributed to the rise 
of nationalism in the world after the end of the Cold War, the rise of China’s economic and 
military power and the reaction to the conflicts with Japan, the United States and other Western 
powers. However, from the perspective of politics in China, the spectacular display of 
nationalism by Chinese students around the world in recent years is a bumper harvest that had 
been seeded and cultivated by the Chinese government through the nationwide “patriotic 
education campaign” (Feng 2009). 
 
Patriotic education has always been a dominant theme of political socialisation in the PRC, 
although the theme was somehow balanced by the interlude of the “Chinese New 
Enlightenment” (xin qimeng) during the decade of 1978-1988, the most exciting period of 
intellectual history in the PRC. The enlightenment project during the period was a new one 
which benefited the Cultural Revolution generation greatly by promoting humanist values and 
critical thinking, just as the Chinese Enlightenment in the 1910s benefited the May 4 generation 
and subsequent generations. After the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in 1989, the 
following collapse of communist regimes around the world and the official communist 
ideology’s consequent loss of credibility, the communist regime in China faced a serious crisis of 
legitimacy. It was the upgrading of patriotic education, as well as rapid economic development, 
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that provided the new “performance legitimacy” to the one-party rule of the CCP in China, 
turning the attention from internal evils to external threat and turning the vast number of young 
Chinese away from liberal values and toward fanatic nationalism. The new “Patriotic Education 
Campaign” was initiated right after the Tiananmen Incident and formally launched in 1991, 
mobilising all of the available resources including the state education system, the public media, 
arts, museums, popular entertainment, and the “Red Tourism Scenic Spots” (Zhao 1998; Wang 
2008).  
 
Three features of this campaign are readily discernable in comparison with political education 
during previous periods in the PRC history. Firstly, nationalism replaced communist ideology as 
the most important legitimisation device. The class-struggle narrative targeting the domestic 
“people’s enemy” of exploited classes gave way to the patriotic narrative targeting “foreign 
hostile forces” which allegedly conspired to keep China down or even destroy China; the 
revolution narrative depicting the CCP as a revolutionary force to eliminate class domination and 
class exploitation was changed into the ruling party narrative describing the CCP as the only 
leading force to unite the Chinese nation, safeguard the sovereignty of China, stand up to the 
West, end national humiliation and achieve wealth and power for China; the social foundation of 
the CCP was expanded to coopt the new rich for building national unity and “harmonious 
society”; old rigid tenets of ma-lie-mao (Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought) prioritising 
class-struggle were superseded by the new pragmatic theories of deng-san-ke (Deng Xiaoping 
Theory, Theory of Three Represents and the Concept of Scientific Development) prioritising 
social and political stability; and the communist ideal of classless society was abandoned for the 
national goal of “relative prosperity (xiaokang) ”  (Hughes 2006).   
 
Secondly, national humiliation and historical grievances moved to the centre of political 
education, in which the anti-Western discourse prevailed over the modernisation discourse or 
rejuvenation discourse (zhenxing zhonghua). The “Anti-Bourgeois Liberalism” campaign was 
combined with the “Anti-Peaceful Evolution” campaign, in which liberal values or 
Enlightenment values were no longer assumed as an intrinsic part of Chinese modernity but 
denounced as part of the Western conspiracy to split up the Chinese and maintain the Western 
hegemony over China; the suffering of the Chinese and the backwardness of China in the 
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modern times were interpreted in terms of victimisation and humiliation of China by the West; 
disputes with democratic countries on human rights issues or commerce were identified as 
“conspiracy of the West” (Wang 2008). Thirdly, the post-June 4 generation, who received 
education after 1989, became the primary target and victim of the campaign aiming to change 
their attitude toward the Western powers and the communist one-party rule. Students from 
kindergartens to universities were fed with the “approved truth” and “approved knowledge” of 
foreign invasions and oppression and kept away from the inconvenient records of the crimes 
committed by the CCP, such as persecution and murder of millions of innocent citizens in 
successive political purges and campaigns; achievements of the Party were highlighted and 
exaggerated whereas access to the information of disasters brought about by the Party such as the 
famine during the Great Leap Forward and democratic challenges such as Democracy Wall 
Movement and Pro-democracy Movement in 1989 were blocked; those singing the praises of the 
Party or Chinese culture were treated as faithful friends of the Chinese whereas criticism made 
by Chinese compatriots of the Party or shortcomings of Chinese culture were condemned as 
unpatriotic; denunciation of the West and liberal values became the most convenient way to 
demonstrate political loyalty and accumulate political capital, whereas expression of liberal 
values became a serious political liability (Feng 2007).  
 
There is little wonder that many of the Chinese students socialised with this kind of worldview 
have become “angry youth” (fen qing) captivated by fanatic nationalism and eager to 
demonstrate their patriotic credentials in showing their support for the Chinese communist 
regime and joining in the anti-West protests, even if they are living in democratic countries 
beyond the control of the Party, provided with free access to knowledge and surrounded by the 
international media. The “angry youth” among the Overseas Chinese are fighting in the forefront 
against the “Western conspiracy”. They vied with one another to join the demonstrations around 
the world against the West during the Beijing Olympics Torch Relay in 2008 as they were so 
angry with the international media criticising the Chinese government in favour of the Tibetans. 
Accepting what they had learned from the “Patriotic Education Campaign”, they believed that 
the behaviour of the international media on the Tibet issue represented an anti-China conspiracy 
dating back to 1900 when the “Allied Troops of Eight Nations” (ba guo lianjun) drove the Qing 
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government out of Beijing and thoroughly looted the capital after putting down the “Boxer 
Rebellion”.  
 
These positions are reflected in this quote from Internet article by a former Chinese student 
living in Canada: 
 
“a new strategic step of the anti-China conspiracy by the Western powers has finally 
emerged: they used the Tibetan separatists to create a violent incident in Tibet, then 
manufactured the public opinion by the Western media about the ‘crackdown’ on the 
minority nationality of the Tibetans by the ‘despotic’ Chinese government and, taking the 
Beijing Olympics Torch Relay around the world as an opportunity, aroused an anti-China 
agitation around the world and in the West in particular. All Western powers joined together 
to express their ‘concern’ and ‘condemnation’, and reserved the right to take further action of 
‘sanction’ against China. The Western powers are attempting to cook up a situation similar 
to the ‘June 4’ and force the Chinese government to the corner prior to the Beijing Olympics, 
using the boycott of the Beijing Olympics as a stake to blackmail the Chinese government 
for concessions, such as the ‘return and restoration’ of the Dalai Lama, and paving the way 
to split up and subvert China.  After the invasion of China by the joint forces of Britain and 
France in the 19th Century, after the invasion of China by the Allied Troops of Eight Nations 
in the early 20th Century,  and after the attempt made by the United Nations troops consisting 
of the troops from 16 countries under the leadership of the United States to intimidate and 
invade China in the mid-20th Century, the Western powers have joined together again  to 
launch a new round of siege and attack on China at the beginning of the 21st Century. This is 
yet another collective attempt by the Western powers to form the new ‘Allied Troops of 
Eight Nations’ and interfere the internal affairs of China” (Zhao 2008).    
 
 
The State-sponsored Chinese Transnationalism in Australia and Re-socialisation of 
Chinese Migrants under Multicultural Democracy  
Transnationalism emerges as one of the central theories in the study of immigration and refers 
primarily to the contemporary phenomenon that immigrants "forge and sustain simultaneous 
multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement" (Basch 
2003). These multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of 
nation-states can take many forms. In the study of multiculturalism and ethnic identity, the 
concept of transnationalism also takes on the dimension of identity construction to understand 
the complexities of multilevel and multipolar bargaining of identities in the multicultural context 
of the host society in the age of globalisation. This is similar to the concept of “long distance 
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nationalism” coined by Benedict Anderson to characterise a new set of identity claims and 
practices that connect people living in various geographical locations to the territory of their 
“ancestral home” (Anderson 1992). Some scholars have cautioned against the tendency within 
the notion of transnationalism to homogenise ethnic groups or diasporic groups with vast internal 
class, regional, sub-ethnic and political diversity (Benton 2003).   
 
In connection to socialisation of Chinese migrants in Australia, attention should to be paid to the 
role played by the Chinese communist party-state in the development of Chinese 
transnationalism in the last two to three decades. Transnationalism in this sense is an extension 
of state nationalism with the invention of transnational solidarity beyond national boundaries and 
the creation of new expressions of belonging and political engagement. The state-sponsored 
Chinese transnationalism does not challenge the Chinese nation-state but on the contrary enables 
it to engage with globalization through economic, cultural, political, and diplomatic united-front 
strategy. The party-state adapts to the new environment of globalisation, imagines itself as a 
transnational actor and becomes the driving force of Chinese transnationalism, coordinating the 
“shared” interests between the Overseas Chinese and the “ancestral homeland” (Zuji Guo). 
 
There have been numerous changes in the relationship between the Overseas Chinese and the 
Chinese states since the modern times, as well as after the CCP’s rise to power in 1949. After the 
16th Century when Europeans began their projects to establish colonies in the Far East, the land-
based and agrarian-centred regimes of the Ming and Qing empires were hostile to the Overseas 
Chinese communities of sojourners living abroad in South-east Asia and beyond (Wang 1991). 
More often than not the Ming and Qing governments exercised a strict ban on the sea trade and 
saw the Overseas Chinese as traitors or as “abandoned subjects of the heavenly dynasty”, until 
the early 1840s when the Qing government was forced through the Opium Wars to open China to 
the outside world and join the modern world. In confirming the fear of the Qing government, the 
Overseas Chinese did become a subversive force playing an important role in the Reform 
Movement with an end to establish the system of constitutional monarchy during the 1890s, 
culminating in the 1911 Revolution to overthrow the Qing Dynasty (Wang 1991).  
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Subsequently, the relationship between the Overseas Chinese and the PRC has passed through 
several stages. For the first three decades after the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese 
communist regime had an uneasy relationship with the Overseas Chinese, although the Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Office was set up at both central and local levels to look after the Overseas 
Chinese affairs. Initially the regime welcomed the return of the Overseas Chinese to take part in 
the construction of “socialist mother land” and support the revolutionary activities of the 
Overseas Chinese in South-east Asia (Cheung  2005). However, the Overseas Chinese eventually 
fell out of favour and the connection with the Overseas Chinese communities became a political 
liability for PRC citizens, who were banned from going abroad for private purposes and killed on 
the spot or sentenced to prison if they tried to leave the country.   
 
Since 1978, when China engaged in reform and opening to the outside world, the Chinese 
communist government has changed its attitude again and re-defined the Overseas Chinese as a 
key force for the project of China’s modernisation. The “new migrants”, the students in 
particular, were originally sent by the party-state to study abroad with the expectation that they 
would “return to serve the motherland” with badly needed expertise after completing their 
programs. By 2003 the number of the “new migrants” had reached 4.2 million (Guo 2004), but 
the party-state was not particularly happy when most of these students chose to stay in the 
developed democratic countries rather than returning to China. Encountering the extreme 
difficulty of attracting those students back to China, especially in the unfavourable post-
Tiananmen situation, the party-state changed the policy of asking the Chinese students to “return 
and serve the country” (huiguo fuwu) to the policy of encouraging the Chinese students to “stay 
but serve the country” (weiguo fuwu), coinciding with the grand national strategy of “marching 
toward the world” (zou xiang shijie) (Miao 2010). 
 
Since the 1990s this version of Chinese transnationalism has been consciously developed by the 
party-state with the close cooperation of the Overseas Chinese as a whole and particularly the 
“new migrants”, who are believed to be bound to China not only by ties of blood but by sharing 
the modernisation project of the party-state. A directive with the title Guanyu kaizhan xinyimin 
gongzuo de yijian [Opinion on Unfolding the New Migrant Work] issued by the Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council of PRC in 1996 stated that: 
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“Strengthening new migrant work has important practical meaning and deep-going, far-
reaching significance for promoting our country’s construction of modernisation, 
implementing the unification of the motherland, expanding our country’s influence and 
developing our country’s relations with the countries of residence” (Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC 1996). 
 
With sponsorship by the party-state, Chinese transnationalism has advanced on both ideological 
and institutional fronts, linking the Overseas Chinese institutionally and emotionally to the 
Chinese government. On the ideological front, a new culture was nurtured by the party-state, 
imagining Chinese migrants as part of the Chinese economy and polity and celebrating migration 
as a patriotic and modern act. In this process “the nature of emigration has turned from 
treacherous, to tolerated but ideologically suspect, to patriotic” (Nyiri 2001, p.637). The 
“ideological work” of the Party is so successful that all of the current Chinese community 
newspapers in Australia adopt the pro-China position, except for The Epoch Times published by 
Falun Gong and The Tiananmen Times published by a Chinese democracy movement 
organization. Although living in Australia, the “new migrants” from China are still surrounded 
by the Chinese media dominated by the Chinese government views and narratives. 
 
On the institutional front, the party-state has established or encouraged the Overseas Chinese to 
establish Chinese transnational corporations, associations, exchange programs, a variety of 
networks, and cultural and professional linkages around the world, cultivating a new army of 
Chinese migrant elites close to China. In Australia, the Chinese state agencies, including the 
Chinese Embassy in Canberra and the General Consulates in Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney, 
are assigned the tasks to identify and coordinate with the patriotic Overseas Chinese leaders 
(aiguo qiaoling) in organising the Chinese communities for the service of the Chinese 
modernisation and unification projects. The traditional Chinese migrant organisations such as the 
native-place associations (tongxiang hui) remain important but they are no longer up to the new 
tasks of mobilising the well-educated, modern and cosmopolitan Chinese migrants to “serve the 
homeland” as the native-place associations focus on charity and liaison functions for the benefit 
of fellow-townsmen. Professional associations and political associations, which focus on social, 
cultural and political issues of transnational or international significance, and conduct their 
business in Mandarin or English rather than native dialects of Chinese localities, have emerged 
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as the dominant form of associational life among Chinese migrant communities. Some of them 
are overtly political, such as Australian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of 
China, Australian Chinese Culture Promotion Society and Australian Council of Chinese 
Organisations. In addition, many of them are professional, such as Friendship Association of 
Chinese Students and Scholars, Federation of Chinese Scholars in Australia, Australian Chinese 
Science and Technology Society, Australian Chinese Engineers Association, Australian Chinese 
Information Communication Technology Professional Society, Australia Chinese Association for 
Biomedical Sciences, Society of Chinese Australian Academics in New South Wales, Victoria 
Association of Chinese PhD Students and Scholars, Queensland Chinese Association of 
Scientists and Engineers, South Australia Chinese Professionals Association, Canberra Society 
of Chinese Scholars, Western Australia Chinese Scientists Association, and Northern Territory 
Chinese Professional Association. According to one estimate, the Chinese migrants have 
established more than 300 associations in New South Wales alone (Tian 2003).   
 
Most of these organisations have established and maintained a close relationship with the 
Chinese state agencies in Australia. Through the Chinese state agencies, these Overseas Chinese 
organisations have also established and maintained connections with many institutions in China. 
Usually there is a clause of “enhancing Sino-Australian understanding and friendship” in their 
constitution and their leaders are usually eager to demonstrate their loyalty to China and seek 
guidance from the Chinese authorities. They organise the celebration of major Chinese festivals, 
the reception of PRC leaders and other delegations from China, the recruitment of experts and 
investors for China, business negotiations involving China, the performance of Chinese culture 
and arts, and a variety of tours to China. The service of these patriotic Overseas Chinese leaders 
is rewarded by the Party with economic benefits and political recognition. The economic benefits 
include profitable projects in China and other preferential treatments in business. Political 
recognition may take the forms of appointments to positions in the united front organisation such 
as the Political Consultative Conference, invitations to join the Chinese leaders on the rostrum of 
Tiananmen or at the People’s Great Hall on the occasions of national ceremonies, and the 
opportunity to meet and take photos with high-ranking Chinese officials during their visits to 
Australia. These symbolic political awards may enhance their position in the Overseas Chinese 
communities and business operations.   
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It is unclear how state-sponsored Chinese transnationalism has shaped the engagement of 
Chinese “new migrants” in Australian multicultural democracy, which provides institutional 
opportunities for political participation of minority ethnic groups. A multicultural democracy is 
defined as deepening of liberal democracy that promotes equality among all ethnocultural 
groups, respects cultural diversity and protects the rights of non-dominant ethnocultural groups 
(indigenous peoples, sub-state national minorities and minority groups of migrants) to keep their 
cultural practices and traditions, compatible with the universal human rights (Kymlicka 1995, 
2007; United Nations Development Programme 2004). Benefiting from the “human rights 
revolution” since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations in 1948, 
multicultural democracy is based on liberal multiculturalism that promotes the policies and 
practices of recognising and accommodating ethnic diversity with the aspiration to deepen 
democracy, expand human freedom and eliminate ethnic and racial hierarchies. In violation of 
these norms, state-sponsored Chinese transnationalism may have delayed the process of political 
re-socialisation of Chinese “new migrants” in Australia. Many of them continue to maintain an 
authoritarian stance, as demonstrated in their eagerness to suppress the basic human rights of 
Tibetans during the Olympic Torch Relay in 2008, and their consent to or support for Chinese 
government in its crackdown on the Chinese democracy movement and the Falun Gong both at 




The development of multicultural democracy and cosmopolitanism in Australia has created a 
favourable environment for political participation by Chinese communities, who practice dual 
loyalty, taking part in Australian political process while engaging in the “politics of homeland”. 
However, the participation of Chinese “new migrants” in Australian politics since the 1980s has 
also been conditioned by their world view formed through their socialisation back in China and 
the rising Chinese transnationalism sponsored by the Chinese government. The illiberal thinking 
and strong Chinese nationalism and transnationalism have prevented many of them from 
integrating into the host society and establishing harmonious relationships with fellow citizens of 
other ethnocultural groups.   
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In recent years there has been a new emphasis on a closer attention to the affairs of the host 
society and the social, cultural and political representation of the Overseas Chinese communities. 
In a report issued by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council of PRC in 
December 2009, the associations of the Overseas Chinese were criticised for unhealthy practices 
such as indifference to the affairs of the host society including the welfare of ordinary members, 
abuses of leadership positions for personal gain or even illegal activities, and the in-fighting and 
unethical competition within an association and among associations (Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Office of the State Council of the PRC 2009). More and more Chinese “new migrants” have 
accomplished political re-socialisation and internalised universal liberal-democratic values to 
become qualified democratic citizens. Great efforts have been made by them to not only 
contribute to the politics of multicultural democracy as active and responsible citizens, but also 
enrich Australian culture by maintaining and expressing their distinctive identities and practices.  
There are good prospects for them to develop a multicultural citizenship that embraces and 
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